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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 8.5 ATTENTION: Low attack complexity Vendor: Delta Electronics Equipment: CNCSoft-G2 DOPSoft Vulnerability: Stack-based Buffer Overflow 2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following versions of Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2, a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) software, are affected:

CNCSoft-G2: Versions 2.0.0.5 (with DOPSoft v5.0.0.93) and prior 3.2 Vulnerability Overview 3.2.1 STACK-BASED BUFFER OVERFLOW CWE-121

Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2 lacks proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process.

CVE-2024-4192 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2024-4192. A base score of 8.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Energy, Critical Manufacturing COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Taiwan 3.4 RESEARCHER

Natnael Samson working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported this vulnerability to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

Delta Electronics recommends users update to CNCSoft-G2 v2.1.0.4 or later.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability,

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RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

SUMMARY

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), and the Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Akira ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations and trusted third party reporting as recently as February 2024.

Since March 2023, Akira ransomware has impacted a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure entities in North America, Europe, and Australia. In April 2023, following an initial focus on Windows systems, Akira threat actors deployed a Linux variant targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines. As of January 1, 2024, the ransomware group has impacted over 250 organizations and claimed approximately $42 million (USD) in ransomware proceeds.

Early versions of the Akira ransomware variant were written in C++ and encrypted files with a .akira extension; however, beginning in August 2023, some Akira attacks began deploying Megazord, using Rust-based code which encrypts files with a .powerranges

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RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

SUMMARY

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA, to disseminate known TTPs and IOCs associated with the Phobos ransomware variants observed as recently as February 2024, according to open source reporting. Phobos is structured as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. Since May 2019, Phobos ransomware incidents impacting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments have been regularly reported to the MS-ISAC. These incidents targeted municipal and county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure entities to successfully ransom several million U.S. dollars.[1],[2]

The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Phobos ransomware and other ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report:

AA24-060A #StopRansomware: Phobos Ransomware (PDF, 677.95 KB )

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How SVR-Attributed Actors are Adapting to the Move of Government and Corporations to Cloud Infrastructure OVERVIEW

This advisory details recent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group commonly known as APT29, also known as Midnight Blizzard, the Dukes, or Cozy Bear.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and international partners assess that APT29 is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the SVR, an element of the Russian intelligence services. The US National Security Agency (NSA), the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) agree with this attribution and the details provided in this advisory.

This advisory provides an overview of TTPs deployed by the actor to gain initial access into the cloud environment and includes advice to detect and mitigate this activity.

To download the PDF version of this report, click here.

PREVIOUS ACTOR ACTIVITY

The NCSC has previously detailed how Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors have targeted governmental, think tank, healthcare, and energy targets for intelligence gain. It has now observed SVR actors expanding their targeting to include aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial

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