RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

Summary

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint advisory to disseminate known RansomHub ransomware IOCs and TTPs. These have been identified through FBI threat response activities and third-party reporting as recently as August 2024. RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service variant—formerly known as Cyclops and Knight—that has established itself as an efficient and successful service model (recently attracting high-profile affiliates from other prominent variants such as LockBit and ALPHV).

Since its inception in February 2024, RansomHub has encrypted and exfiltrated data from at least 210 victims representing the water and wastewater, information technology, government services and facilities, healthcare and public health, emergency services, food and agriculture, financial services, commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, transportation, and communications critical infrastructure sectors.

The affiliates leverage a double-extortion

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RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

Summary

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders that, as of August 2024, a group of Iran-based cyber actors continues to exploit U.S. and foreign organizations. This includes organizations across several sectors in the U.S. (including in the education, finance, healthcare, and defense sectors as well as local government entities) and other countries (including in Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates). The FBI assesses a significant percentage of these threat actors’ operations against US organizations are intended to obtain and develop network access to then collaborate with ransomware affiliate actors to deploy ransomware. The FBI further assesses these Iran-based cyber actors are associated with the Government of Iran (GOI) and—separate from the ransomware activity—conduct computer network exploitation activity in support of the GOI (such as intrusions enabling the theft of sensitive technical data against organizations in Israel and Azerbaijan).

This CSA provides the threat actor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs), as well as highlights similar activity from a previous advisory (Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities) that the FBI and CISA published on Sept. 15, 2020. The information and guidance in this advisory are derived from FBI investigative activity and technical

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RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

Executive Summary

This publication defines a baseline for event logging best practices to mitigate cyber threats. It was developed by the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) in cooperation with the following international partners: 

United States (US) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). United Kingdom (UK) National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK). Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) and Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT NZ). Japan National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) and Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC). The Republic of Korea National Intelligence Services (NIS) and NIS’s National Cyber Security Center (NCSC-Korea). Singapore Cyber Security Agency (CSA). The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

Event logging supports the continued delivery of operations and improves the security and resilience of critical systems by enabling network visibility. This guidance makes recommendations that improve an organization’s resilience in the current cyber threat environment, with regard for resourcing constraints. The guidance is of moderate technical complexity and assumes a basic understanding of event logging.

An effective event logging solution aims to:

Send alerts to the network defenders responsible for monitoring when cyber security events such as critical

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RSS feed source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducted a red team assessment (RTA) at the request of a critical infrastructure organization. During RTAs, CISA’s red team simulates real-world malicious cyber operations to assess an organization’s cybersecurity detection and response capabilities. In coordination with the assessed organization, CISA is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory to detail the red team’s activity—including their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and associated network defense activity. Additionally, the advisory contains lessons learned and key findings from the assessment to provide recommendations to network defenders and software manufacturers for improving their organizations’ and customers’ cybersecurity posture.

Within this assessment, the red team (also referred to as ‘the team’) gained initial access through a web shell left from a third party’s previous security assessment. The red team proceeded to move through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and into the network to fully compromise the organization’s domain and several sensitive business system (SBS) targets. The assessed organization discovered evidence of the red team’s initial activity but failed to act promptly regarding the malicious network traffic through its DMZ or challenge much of the red team’s presence in the organization’s Windows environment.

The red team was able to compromise the domain and SBSs of the organization as it lacked sufficient controls to detect and respond to their activities. The red team’s findings

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