Infrastructure

Natural gas remains the largest source of hydrogen in our long-term projections

Published: 4 August 2025
Categories: US Energy Information Administration

RSS feed source: US Energy Information Administration

In-brief analysis

August 4, 2025

In our recently published Annual Energy Outlook 2025 (AEO2025), we introduced our new Hydrogen Market Module (HMM), which allows us to model the market for hydrogen in the coming decades.

In most AEO2025 cases, we project hydrogen production will increase by around 80% in 2050 compared with 2024 and most hydrogen (H2) will be produced from natural gas in a process known as steam methane reforming (SMR). In most cases, we project less than 1% of hydrogen will be produced via electrolyzers, which use electricity to produce hydrogen from water, regardless of supportive policies.

In most of the cases we ran, we considered laws and regulations in place as of December 2024, which meant including tax credits implemented under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), such as the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen

Click this link to continue reading the article on the source website.

CISA and USCG Identify Areas for Cyber Hygiene Improvement After Conducting Proactive Threat Hunt at US Critical Infrastructure Organization

Published: 29 July 2025
Categories: US-Computer Emergency Readiness Team

RSS feed source: US Energy Information Administration

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) are issuing this Cybersecurity Advisory to present findings from a recent CISA and USCG hunt engagement. The purpose of this advisory is to highlight identified cybersecurity issues, thereby informing security defenders in other organizations of potential similar issues and encouraging them to take proactive measures to enhance their cybersecurity posture. This advisory has been coordinated with the organization involved in the hunt engagement.

CISA led a proactive hunt engagement at a U.S. critical infrastructure organization with the support of USCG analysts. During hunts, CISA proactively searches for evidence of malicious activity or malicious cyber actor presence on customer networks. The organization invited CISA to conduct a proactive hunt to determine if an actor had been present in the organization’s environment. (Note: Henceforth, unless otherwise defined, “CISA” is used in this advisory to refer to the hunt team as an umbrella for both CISA and USCG analysts).

During this engagement, CISA did not identify evidence of malicious cyber activity or actor presence on the organization’s network, but did identify cybersecurity risks, including:

Insufficient logging; Insecurely stored credentials; Shared local administrator (admin) credentials across many workstations; Unrestricted remote access for local admin accounts; Insufficient network segmentation configuration between IT and operational technology (OT) assets; and Several device misconfigurations.

In

Click this link to continue reading the article on the source website.